REMARKS TO AIR FORCE CADETS

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Why need for clearly defined missions? Outputs

Basis for all planning decisions at all levels

- Just as director of academics at USAF Academy must understand what you will be expected to do/know (output) in order to design proper educational program (input).
 - So C of S of Air Force must know what the USAF is expected to do (output) in order to build/train forces, buy equipment and develop tactics, (inputs):
 - The <u>output</u> is really just the mission. Mission of the USAF Academy/

History of Naval Missions - very briefly -

Evolved over time.

Sea Control

...

1 Cut off movement of armies and their support - led to
Salamis
Battles of Atlantic

o Trade increased

Protection/Denial of Trade - Blockade

2 • Today: Sortie/Choke Pt/Local Engagement/Open area ops Sea Control Tactics Note - Triple threat - air - surface - sub

Projection of Power - 19th C development

3 Sea Control Chart

2

SLIDES

rojection Tactics

井 7 Chart for

TacAir

Approved For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4 assault)

(French Revolutionary Wars)

● TacAir - post WW II

Possible as a/c and munitions improved

• Today: Amphibious Assault

Naval Bombardment

TacAir

Presence - 19th Century - Gunboat Diplomacy

- Preventive Deployment
- Reactive Deployment

Fleets

Strategic Deterrence

New mission

Generally exclusive of other missions

(special/dedicated forces: Polaris/Poseidon/Trident)

SLIDE

Strategic

Assured Second Strike

Controlled Response

Deter Third Powers

Balance of power image

Summary - 4 missions - interrelated

11 Summary 4 missions interrelated

Transition to Air Force Missions

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4 Missions change as world situation/national goals change.

- Can see how naval missions developed and emphasis changed.
- True of Air Force missions also? Let's look -
- Can any comparisons be made between USN and USAF missions?

 Let's take them separately.

(OPEN DISCUSSION AT THIS POINT TO INCLUDE CADETS)

Air Force Comparisons

SLIDE

9 USAF missions Here's statement of Air Force Mission. It talks about many of the same things I've just discussed with relation to naval mission.

5

SLIDES

9 USAF - 44. Missions

11 USN Strategic Deterrence

Strategic - Where Air Force fit it?

Start w/B-52 - which purpose?

Controlled response - Yes

Deter 3rd powers - Yes

Balance of power - ?

Minuteman

2nd strike - Yes

Controlled response - ?

Command data buffer

Conflict with appearing to have 1st strike

Approved For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4 Polaris/Poseidon

• Best for assured 2nd

Controlled - ?

Accuracy

Range vs Security

Communications

• TRIAD

Sea Control

SLIDES

2

USN Sea Control

3

Sea Control Chart

Sortie Contributions

Subs

Mining

B-52? C-5A?

Air Attacks on bases -

B-52 - ?

Choke Point

Subs

Mining

Air

Air interceptors

Anti-Ship

Attack aircraft

Alternative uses

Base loading/availability

o Open Area

Recco - air - satellite

Anti-Ship

P-3 type capability?

Local Engagement

Inteceptors

8

Projection of Power Ashore

SLIDE

10 acAir Tactics

7 acAir Chart • Approved For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4

• Tac Air

Deep Interdiction

Where one better other?

Security of bases

Ships - sea control

Land - mortars -

overrun -

geography,

long approach

Battlefield/CAS

Need for bases -

Navy quick response

AF - C-5A/mobility/bare base kits

9

SLIDES

9 USAF Missions

4 USN Presence

Air Force Missions

Presence

- How can Air Force perform?
 - 1. Okinawa, Japan, Taiwan, Europe

Advantages -

Commitment

Permanent -

Ready

- 2. C-5A Air movement in exercises/demonstrations
- 3. Rescue/humanitarian operations

Conclusion

These are questions you must ask self when evaluating what the Air Force should be prepared to do.

You must begin now to question the rationale for your Service's mission. We are trying to do this in the USN.

10

Approved For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4 Don't assume missions remain relevant over time.

- Be skeptical of traditional rationale and hackneyed phases, e.g., aerospace power - does it support the goals of a special interest group more than national goals - or mere Madison Ave. salesmanship?
- Is there a better way of doing what you are doing? With commitments all over the world, limited resources, an unsympathetic public (generall the case in peacetime).
 - Priorities must be established so \$ spent wisely.
 - Inter-service cooperation encouraged.
 - Gold plating ended (lo mix).

11

You can make a <u>real</u> contribution to your service and the nation now by:

developing a skeptical, inquisitive mind (ask "why" a lot;
 question rationale, motives, etc.)

don't accept things because they've always been that way

Speak out

Study, analyze, criticize, recommend.

Write articles -

Express your ideas.

You'd be surprised who'll publish them (Naval Institute, War College Review)

• Above all, THINK about the big issues of national defense

for they influence everything else in the military. Approved For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4 NAVAL MISSIONS

USAF ACADEMY CATETS

VuGraph Sequence

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L]	SFT			RIGHT			
		Sea Control		·			
1.	(Salamis)			12			
2	(Tactics)			G (Chart)			
		Projection of Power					
6	(Tactics)		7	(TacAir Chart)			
	•	Presence					
4	(Tactics)		. 5	5 (Fleets)			
		Strategic Deterrence					
8	(Tactics)		:	. T			
		Mission Summary					
11	(Missions interrelated)						
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9	(USAF Missions)						
9 .	(USAF Missions)		11	(Strategic Deterrence)			
2	(Sea Control Tactics)		3	(Sea Control Chart)			
10	(TacAir Tactics)		7	(TacAir Chart)			
9 ((11000110)						
9 (Approved For Release 2 (USAF Missions)	2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003	37000 ⁻	10001-4			

Back up Slides:

- 12 A/C & Weapon Characteristics
- 13 Army Missions
- 14 Assertion/Denial Sea Control
- 15 Weapon Systems Applicable to Sea
- 16 Comparison of Amphibious Task Organization



SEA CONTROL Sortie Control Choke Point Control Open Area Operations Local Engagement




PROJECTION OF POWER ASHORE

- Amphiblous Assault
 - MAF
 - · MAB
 - MAU
 - Raid
 - Naval Bombardment
- Direct
 - Indirect
 - Tactical Air
 - Deep Interdiction
 - Battlefield Interdiction
 - Close Air Support
 - Counter-Air/Anti-Air




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Assured Second Strike
Controlled Response
Deter Third Powers
Balance Of Power Image



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MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

TO PROVIDE AEROSPACE FORCES FOR DETERRENCE OF WAR THROUGH READINESS TO RESPOND QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO ANY LEVEL OF AGGRESSION, FROM GENERAL WAR TO LIMITED WAR AND INSURGENCY ACTIVITY

- 1. STRATEGIC DETERRENCE
- 2 AREA AIR SUPERIORITY
- 3 COMBAT SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES
- 4. RECONNAISSANCE
- STRATEGIC AIRLIET FOR THE ARMED

ECTION TACTICS TACTICAL

DEEPINTERDICTION

BATTLEFIELD INTERDICTIO CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

COUNTER-AIR / ANTI-AIR

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
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A + B = C

A = what now exists?

C = what would I like it to be?

B = what is the difference between A and C?

That is what must be done.

In the case of the NWC:

After I received my assignment as President, had about 5 months before taking over.

A. I sought to answer: "What should one teach at a War College?" What does a mid-career military officer need to improve his effectiveness/productivity? (In other words: what are your objectives?"

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- Gather ideas don't evaluate them immediately
 - must be objective unbiased
 - must be completely open to all ideas, good and bad
 - must seek out all available counsel. (Good ideas sometimes come from unlikely places)
- Asked a small group of respected educators, industrialists bureaucrats, intellectuals to join me in Washington to discuss what they believed the strengths and weaknesses of the military officer were. (Can also be a means for testing your initial ideas).
- Approved For Release 2005/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003700010001-4

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2. Narrowness of view, e.g., Industry-profi

impossible. Vast scope worth covering.

Method of thinking approach.

A vague idea of approaching mid-career military education: through the three disciplines with which most officers are involved one way or

- strategy
- management

They seemed basic to the needs of 0-4's and above. (The danger here is to become set too quickly.

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B. At the same time, was examining the extant WC program.

Must influence the form of any new program which might
be decided upon. Some examples of the things I found
which disturbed me:

Review of syllabus showed literally hundreds of subjects covered. Every Navy community was represented: ASW, AAW, subs, Intelligence, Oceanography, etc. Course lacked discernable form. Every year added something due to pressures/vogue of the day. How could you cover so many subjects and hope to have an integrated course?

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*Decision: Reduce subject diversity; teach a few subjects in depth. Learl out. Conscious

• Course was very current events oriented. Today's international picture. If material is current, it must be time sensitive, ergo value to student must be short.

*<u>Decision</u>: Course should be of permanent value to student. Should bring about a fundamental improvement in officer's capability.

Over 170 guest speakers during school year.

Fact: you cannot design a course around a guest speaker over whose lecture content you have no control.

Never know, what the course will be from year to year for the Concern for fourth ments and a few will be active and content predictable. Must establish high grade in-house capability to teach the course.

• Trips - Student trips (NYC to UN; London to Royal Defense College) were expensive, used up valuable time. How did they enforce what the NWC was trying to teach? Were they really necessary? Could the money/time be better used?

*<u>Decision</u>: Benefits not worth costs. Time too precious. Cut out the trips. Use money for books.

Extra curricula Masters degree program (GWU)

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- they competed for student time - 2 manual and the competed for student time

- if needed to prop us NWC program, then NWC not doing job
- Navy had 3X more MS's in International Affairs than it could use. Why make more?

*Decision: End these programs. Strengthen NWC program. Demand more from students.

Decided on course theme: Learn to handle uncertainty.

Basic needs of the 0-4/5:

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• Recognize non-quantifiable, non-rational decision factors, e.g., bureaucracy.

This would represent a permanent change of long range

benefit to the officer.

IV. Risks: (must be weighed for every decision against ex-

pected benefits).

Not being able to define the new program.

Not being able to find the right people. Could a team be put together which could implement the program?

Two

- Time against us. To throw out old syllabus, needed a new one. Could we be ready for next school year?
- Could new program be sold to "powers"?
- If new program were a flop, could the NWC's reputation survive?
- Could resistence to change be overcome? (alumni, past

Presidents, ex-CNO's, retired flag community, etc.)

Helps vs Hindrances:

Admiral Zumwalt gave full support and encouragement to make changes I saw fit - Direct pipeline.

VADM Cagle (head of Ed & Training in USN) also full support.

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in time, 15

de Objek

- couldn't get faculty
- couldn't get books/materials
- couldn't get lecturers
- couldn't get printing done
- couldn't mold faculty into team
- Incoming students caught by surprise expected one thing, get another.

VI. Implementing the Plan:

A. Decided if wanted to accomplish major change, had to use Blitzkreig vice gradual methods. Would be absorbed by bureaucracy over period of several months.

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B. Decided necessary to break established hierarchy and put own people in key jobs.

- to get control of program and get it going, appointed 3 academic department heads in whom I had faith. Gradually stripped College directors of assets - this was interim step toward reorganization where academic departments would control faculty assets; Colleges would be admin caretakers of students.

 personally oversaw/approved all conceptual/ mechanical/administrative aspects as they developed.

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. Seeking support/fine tuning:

- A. Enlisting support.
 - Active PR program to explain rationale for changes.
 Much criticism based on incomplete or incorrect information.
 - Personal communication with key flag officers
 (active & retired), old NWC supporters, other
 Senior Service School Directors, etc., to explain
 rationale, enlist support.
 - 3. Open door policy to press.



request for comments on utility of the course they received.

Hired outside curriculum evaluator.

a) International lawyers

Letters to SecNav

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Where did resistance to innovation raise its head?

Special interest groups

b) Sub - components of Navy
e.g. communications
WWMMCS

quarter litter

- c) People who see opportunities to indoctrinate
- 2. Alumni Friends of College

Some influential

e.g. GSD attendees

Well placed aides

Some seniors -

3. Retired

Rub off of Z opposition

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Ales Hope

Faculty

a) downright opposition Leaks to press Disturbing to students

- b) pressure for contemporary
- c) pressure for completeness
- Students 5. Especially contemporary

this change can be isolated

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Expendenchery harden

Approved For Release 2005/11/23: GIA-RD 80801554R003700010001-4 change made, resisted further summy change made well settled while summy

XI. What would I do differently?

Convocation address (explanation of rationale and program to incoming students) might have been too Possibly could have encouraged less abrasive. resistance to change with a strong yet unabrasive address.

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- President's Hours Gripe sessions Do people keep finding things which are wrong; do you keep asking what's wrong? Constant pulse taking.
- Fire some faculty peremptorily
- What would you have done differently?

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Discontinuo Navy-Marine forces

Especially sea control forces essential to

any credible threat/support

any credible threat/support

Contingency forces and Navy-Marine spearhead

Secure air/beach heads

Curring edge only

Army/Air Force

Rapid closure forces

Sustained combat forces

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Way we make public comparisons shapes attitudes,
eriteria of "other nations"

B. Conventional Forces

Possuse purious purious allegance paneum
Visible

Credible, to those who lenew whose peacetime

presence will help deter

Commitment forces - hostage forces

Europe

Demonstration forces

/Display interest/intent